Why the British Empire is the most successful Empire Ever:

The British empire is the most successful empire ever:

The British empire was the most successful empire in history creating unparalleled wealth, over 500 billion by 1913, it used its unrivalled sea power to conquer 24 percent of the world’s landmass by 1920^[1], the largest territory ever held by an Empire. This essay will argue that Britain’s economic efficiency and strategic ingenuity was the reason for its distinguishable success and unmatched power in these two regards.

Context.

The British empire began in the late 1500s, with the Queen of England at the Time Queen Elizebeth 1^st giving explorers permission and monetary support to expand Britain’s interests abroad as well as modernising the British navy. Emboldened by the vulnerabilities stemming from the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588^[2]which gave Britain control over Atlantic trade routes.

Britain’s colonial holdings began in the early 1600s firstly the capturing of Jamestown NA and Barbados in the Caribbean. The 1700s saw an expansion in India, Sri Lanka and Australia mainly by private monopolies like the EIC. As Britain colonies grew so did its wealth and power driven from the resources it had access to, its GDP jumping from 140 million in 1800s to 500 million in the 1900s^[3]. The 1800s saw a peak in British colonial expansion into Africa and the nationalisation of India called the British Raj taken away from EIC after 1857 revolt^[4].By the 1900s Britain controlled a quarter of the world, expanding further after WW1.

The Great Empire came to eventual end in 1947, where post WW2 Britain was so largely encumbered by debt and faced with rising nationalism in key territories in mobilised from it had to give up its empire.

How this essay determines success:

Adam Smith a key British Philosopher of the liberal idea and a historian on the British empire defined Success of empire on Territorial and Economic lines^[5]. Territory enabled greater access to resources and showed strength through control which was not always based on military. He saw economics as sources of stability and power, wealth bought a nation a strong military and an ability to compete with adversaries. So, under this guideline the British empire was the largest empire by 42 percent, in comparison to second biggest Mughal. The British empire was also the wealthiest in 1913 with a 561B GDP compared to second biggest Qing Dynasty 247B GDP^[6].Hence making it the most successful

Why was it successful? Because its economic efficiency allowed it to generate wealth and territory.

Point 1- The British Empire possessed unprecedented economic efficiency in its colonial system, allowing it to generate unparalleled amounts of wealth and to expand and mobilise resources in a way that has never been replicated.

British Historian Niall Ferguson argued the British empire “Turned colonial economies into Engines of Modernity does not plunder” Framing the British colonial economics as the most effective imperial model^[7]. The British system prioritised reinvestment and economics over cultural or social domination, making colonies long term projects infrastructural and technological investments aimed at maximising resource extraction and self-sufficiency. Britain’s move toward free trade enabled a profit to fuel continued naval investment which ensured limitless territorial expansion. Whilst its cost-effective decentralised occupation model limited costs. Essentially the British economic efficiencies yielded greater wealth and power.

Why wealth invested continuously into British Naval power led to unseen success for empire.

Paul Kennedy rightly argued that Britain’s naval investments were the backbone of its imperial success.^[8]Britain had a persistent naval advantage on the sea driven from Numerical and Technological power, which was present as early as the 1600s. Britain operated 214 ship of line battleships by the 1815s compared to its chief adversary at the time France with just 80 ships^[9]. The Caribbean islands produced significant revenues in the late 1600s from Sugar, which corresponded with a jump in its naval budget with funding rising from 1.2 million in 1690s to 2.5 million in 1720s^[10].

Why a stronger navy lead to advantages for greater empire:

Britain’s large navy enabled by its wealth from colonies, allowed it to beat European neighbours in key naval engagements allowing it to continue to expand and get preferential selection of the best territories. This was evidenced in the Battle of Quarrion Bay against the French, using superior naval power to cripple the French fleet and take control of timber rich Canada^[11]. Britain’s navy due to larger investment was faster and more numerous meaning it could concentrate force more effectively which Mahan acknowledges is crucial to naval strategy. It used this superior navy to scare off European challenges and keep control of its existing colonies through cost effective blockades and coast bombardments.

Britain had cost effective forms of occupation, aiding to its economic success.

Fredrick Ludgurad a prominent colonial administrator championed the notion that Britain’s approach to territorial occupation, marked by cultural sensitivity and cost cutting^[12]. Britain drove costs of occupation down and profits high, through its revolutionary strategy of indirect rule of its colonies, relying on flat structures of hierarchy and existing hierarchal systems to police their rule. British administrators deliberately coerced and used local leaders via economic and military incentives, to deal with collection of taxes and suppression of resistance. The use of local forces was widespread across the empire and reduced the costs of having a large standing British army and eased local anxieties and resistance due to a lack of foreign dominance being visible. There was a deliberate unique avoidance of cultural intrusion in the occupational model, existing practises like Sharia courts in Nigeria were respected and protected, which created less friction. Moreover, inherently using less native-born Brits meant Britain could recruit colonial troops at much cheaper rates, unlike other empires. This effective cheap model was seen in Kenya, Malaysia and Nigeria where Britain operated countries often with under 60 ruling officials with Garrisons not exceeding 3000 men. Costs were minimal, ranging from 3 to 5 million per annum^[13].

This system appears very cost effective when compared to other empires. The Frenchs occupation of Algeria and Indo China for instance although having similar populations, cost 25 million and 15 million per annum alike. There systems required at time more than 3000 ruling officials and Garrisons in Algeria of 60,000 and into China 30,000 French soldiers^[14]. This is because like many other Empires the French seek to culturally and socially subvert and integrate colonies into their countries system. France heavily relied on native French expensive professional soldiers to manage their colonial territories creating high costs. As well as the fact the French did not reinvest in not settler areas often, meaning loyalty derived from prosperity was not accessed. Britain culturally sensitive approach indirect approach meant it ultimately had a more cost-effective method of occupation, which meant its colonies cost it less and were more profitable and long term

Reinvestment-Economic Effectiveness

Tirthankar Roy argued reinvestments into colonial infrastructure created productive economic units that far exceeded the value of European Plundering strategy^[15]. Britain uniquely heavily reinvested into its colonies continuously, aimed at increasing long term productivity and long-term growth, moving away from the plundering approach of previous empires. Britain invested infrastructure of its colonies in India particularly railroad and port, which drove down transport costs and enabled for diversification of industry. In India alone Britain spent 270 million on building 24,000 miles of railroad tracks^[16]. These investments also were in the form of technology, in the form of increasing effectiveness and general output of resource collection and production. In India Britain invested 20 million into Channel Irrigation to increase the amount of arable land in the country, the biggest example being the Punjab Canal project costing 10 million. This project turned 14 million more acres into arable land from 1868 to to 1947 most being wheat production^[17].

The genius of the reinvestment cycle is many of these projects in infrastructure and technology were paid for by colonies themselves, via profits from external trade with non-empire countries. Meaning increases in capacity led to more revenue and therefore more investment, creating an everlasting cycle of growth. Reinvestment also served to create more loyalty within populations who experienced greater living standards due to nearby industry and allowed for quick military responses from ports and military hubs via railroad to any dissent. Britain invested 50 million in South Africa but extracted 200 million in income from the country between 1890 and 1940, showing how reinvesting in colonies created wealth and economic efficiency^[18].

To contrast this, the lack of appetite of reinvestment in the Portuguese occupation of Brazil led to an eventual decrease in revenue from gold of up to 50 percent from 1650 to 1750^[19]. This is because Portugal had refused to invest in technologies to better cultivate sugar and had depleted its existing gold mines and did not invest in deeper mining tech or infrastructure into the interior to find more sources of revenue. The French failed to reinvest into their navy due to lack of investment in their colonies, Paul Kenedy says “Frances’s failure to reinvest in Saint Dominque saw colonial cash crash from 6-8 million to 5-7 million post 1804. This left France with insufficient funds to expand its navy beyond 80 ships^[20]”, meaning they were not building their power like the British.

Britain moves toward Free Trade from mercantilism enabling Wealth Creating colonies which were self-sufficient- Economic Efficiency.

Britain took an unprecedented approach to colonial economics one based on free trade, Anthony Howe argued this turned colonies into “Dynamic economic entities capable of generating their own wealth and contributing to imperial prosperity”^[21]. Free trade meant that Colonies were able to produce and sell raw materials and goods to countries outside of the empire, accessing Global Demand from Europe and America and building wealth. Indias trade massively skyrocketed after the implementation of free trade in the 1850s, increasing exports 220 percent in general and 300 percent to non-empire countries^[22]. By the 1900s India was making the same or more revenue from trade with external traders than within the empire, 60 percent coming externally. Trade surplus revenues from this were used to reinvest into further growth and diversification, for example the building of the India Tata Iron and Steel Company, which use export revenues to start. Its production numbers grew by 500,000 tonnes from 1912 and 1930^[23], showing growth driven by reinvestment. Britain was also able to generate much more wealth from this free trade system, Colonies were taxed home charges and trade was taxed through duties, this created a significant amount of wealth. This can be compared to the shortfalls of the Spanish silver economy in south America during its occupation, which lead to falling revenues and poor growth within its colonies and made them costly endeavours. This vastly increased the amount of wealth the Empire produced and meant it could continue to keep reinvesting in its economic power through building more industry whilst also maintaining and building its military power

.

How Economical Prowess helped the British mobilise manpower for wars better:

David Omissi pledged British mobilisation was bolstered significantly by economic incentives^[24]. Empires in times of war relied on the manpower and resources within their territories to provide them numerical advantages needed to win. The British Empire Mobilised quicker than others due to its investments in railway and sea power. Soldiers were able to be collected and brought to the frontline at a rapid rate, like the 8000 strong Indian deployment to the Boer War in 1899. Britain also was able to foster a loyalty in their Mobic’s through skilful social and economic incentive. Indian soldiers in WW2 were promised land and higher pay, many being from rural communities purposely trying loyalty to the prosperity of their villages. Moreover, Britain fostered unit pride based on community guidelines and ideas of honour, through distinguishable uniform identity and the tying of bravery to community standing back home. British desertion and volunteer ratios in comparison to other empires were much more positive, WW2 2+million Indians volunteered less than 1 percent desertion rate^[25]. French mobilisation efforts 90 percent conscripted, 15 percent desertion rate^[26]showing an asymmetry in effectiveness of mobilisation.

Conclusion:

The British Empire is the most successful empire in history due to its mastery of economic efficiency and sustainable wealth creation, which fuelled its expansion enabled by naval power. Unlike other empires Britain’s ruthless economic focus and reliance on sea power avoiding ideological goals, made it a force of conquest never seen before. Britain’s island status gave it the key to success the sea, there will never be a more powerful and smart empire like it for a very long time, I’m sure

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Bibliography:

Bayly, C. A. Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Boxer, Charles R. The Golden Age of Brazil, 1695–1750. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962.

Clayton, Anthony. The Wars of French Decolonization. London: Longman, 1994.
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Feinstein, Charles H. An Economic History of South Africa: Conquest, Discrimination and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Ferguson, Niall. Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World. London: Allen Lane, 2003.
Howe, Anthony. Free Trade and Liberal England, 1846–1946. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.

Kennedy, Paul M. The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. London: Allen Lane, 1976.

Kennedy, Paul M. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House, 1987.

Lugard, Frederick J. D. The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1922.

Maddison, Angus. Contours of the World Economy, 1–2030 AD: Essays in Macro-Economic History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Maddison, Angus. The World Economy: Historical Statistics. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2003.
Mattingly, Garrett. The Armada. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959.

Omissi, David. The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860–1940. London: Macmillan, 1994.

Perham, Margery. Native Administration in Nigeria. London: Oxford University Press, 1937.

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Sheridan, Richard B. Sugar and Slavery: An Economic History of the British West Indies, 1623–1775. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974.

Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edited by R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.

Stone, Ian. Canal Irrigation in British India: Perspectives on Technological Change in a Peasant Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Taagepera, Rein. “Size and Duration of Empires: Growth-Decline Curves, 600 B.C. to 600 A.D.” Social Science History3, no. 3/4 (1979): 115–138.

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^[1] Taagepera, Rein. “Size and Duration of Empires: Growth-Decline Curves, 600 B.C. to 600 A.D.” Social Science History3, no. 1 (1978): 115–138. Cited pages: 120–125 (for the British Empire’s territorial size compared to the Mongol Empire).

^[2] Mattingly, Garrett. The Armada. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959. Cited pages: 300–320 (for the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 and its impact on Atlantic trade).

^[3] Maddison, Angus. Contours of the World Economy, 1–2030 AD: Essays in Macro-Economic History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Cited pages: 70–80 (for British wealth in 1913), 90–100 (for comparative GDP with the Qing Dynasty).

^[4] Bayly, C. A. Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Cited pages: 110–130 (for the expansion in India and the British Raj post-1857).

^[5] Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edited by R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976. Cited pages: 590–600 (for the definition of imperial success based on territory and economics).

^[6] Angus Maddison, The World Economy, Historical Statistics 2003 and Rein Taagepera “Size and Duration of Empires: Growth-Decline Curves, 600 BC to A.D” Social Science History 3:

^[7] Ferguson, Niall. Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World. London: Allen Lane, 2003. Cited pages: 150–170.

^[8] Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. London: Allen Lane, 1976. Cited pages: 120–140.

^[9] Rodger, N. A. M. The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815. London: Allen Lane, 2004. Cited pages: 269–272.

^[10] Sheridan, Richard B. Sugar and Slavery: An Economic History of the British West Indies, 1623–1775. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. Cited pages: 200–220.

^[11] Rodger, N. A. M. The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815. London: Allen Lane, 2004. Cited pages: 269–272.

^[12] Lugard, Frederick J. D. The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1922. Cited pages: 200–220.

^[13] Perham, Margery. Native Administration in Nigeria. London: Oxford University Press, 1937. Cited pages: 150–170.

^[14] Clayton, Anthony. The Wars of French Decolonisation. London: Longman, 1994. Cited pages: 50–70.

^[15] Roy, Tirthankar. The Economic History of India, 1857–1947. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Cited pages: 100–120.

^[16] Roy, Tirthankar. The Economic History of India, 1857–1947. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Cited pages: 100–120.

^[17] Stone, Ian. Canal Irrigation in British India: Perspectives on Technological Change in a Peasant Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Cited pages: 150–170.

^[18] Feinstein, Charles H. An Economic History of South Africa: Conquest, Discrimination and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Cited pages: 80–100.

^[19] Boxer, Charles R. The Golden Age of Brazil, 1695–1750. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. Cited pages: 12–15, 254–258.

^[20] Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House, 1987. Cited pages: 125–127.

^[21] Howe, Anthony. Free Trade and Liberal England, 1846–1946. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. Cited pages: 50–70.

^[22] Roy, Tirthankar. The Economic History of India, 1857–1947. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Cited pages: 100–120.

^[23] Ferguson, Niall. Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World. London: Allen Lane, 2003. Cited pages: 180–200.

^[24] Omissi, David. The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860–1940. London: Macmillan, 1994. Cited pages: 90–110.

^[25] Omissi, David. The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860–1940. London: Macmillan, 1994. Cited pages: 90–110.

^[26] Martin, Thomas. The French Empire at War, 1940–45. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998. Cited pages: 30–50.